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The primary objective of this paper is to investigate the simulta-
neity of corporate hedging and debt policies. Using a pooled sample
of Indonesian non-financial listed firms covering the periods of 1996-
2001, the present study finds evidence that corporate hedging and debt
policies are simultaneously determined. That is, the use of debts
motivate firms to hedge; but simultaneously, hedging increases debt
capacity and induces firms to borrow more in order to take advantage
of the tax benefits arising from additional debt capacity. Another
important finding is that financially distressed firms –as indicated by
their debt restructuring programs– are less motivated to hedge,
because such firms will see that the option values of their equity will
increase as their cash-flow volatilities increase. Therefore, finan-
cially distressed firms tend not to hedge; or at least, hedge lesser
compared to those of firms that do not experience financial distress.
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Introduction
Anecdotal evidence shows that
many Indonesian firms use foreign cur-
rency debts to finance their operation
and investment activities. The interest
rate difference between the foreign cur-
rency and the Rupiah denominated loans
is believed to be a primary reason for
employing foreign currency debts. Nev-
ertheless, firms are quite aware that
employing foreign currency debts to
exploit short-term foreign exchange
market inefficiencies1 will expose them
to foreign currency risk which might
threaten their profitability, or even per-
haps their survivability. Therefore, to
mitigate the currency risk associated
with the use of foreign currency de-
nominated debts, many Indonesian
firms implement hedging programs with
currency derivative instruments –such
as currency forwards, futures, swaps,
and options.
According to Modigliani-Miller’s
(1958, 1963) analysis of capital struc-
ture policy, hedging programs do not
create value for the shareholders be-
cause they can omit the firm’s hedging
program in their analysis to suit their
individual risk appetite. If this is so,
then why do firms hedge? The answer
lies on the fact that the Modigliani-
Miller’s (1958, 1963) analysis is based
on the assumptions of perfect capital
markets, symmetric information, and
equal access to capital markets. Obvi-
ously, all these assumptions are vio-
lated in the real world.
Based on capital market imper-
fections (e.g. corporate taxes and trans-
action costs), financial economists have
developed several theories attempting
to explain what motivates firms to
hedge. They argue that firms hedge in
order to reduce expected tax liabilities
and financial distress costs (Smith and
Stulz 1985), minimize underinvest-
ment costs (Froot et al.1993), and alle-
viate asset substitution problems aris-
ing from agency conflicts between
shareholders and debt-holders (Culp
2001). Therefore, it is claimed that the
implementation of a hedging program
by a firm will create value for its share-
holders through reductions in tax li-
abilities, financial distress costs,
underinvestment costs, and agency
costs. Employing a sample of 720 large
US nonfinancial firms between 1990
and 1995, Allayannis and Weston
(2001) find a positive relation between
firm value –as proxied by Tobin’s Q–
and the use of foreign currency deriva-
tives. Using data from Indonesian listed
non-financial firms between 1996 and
2001, Suriawinata (2004) has con-
ducted a similar study and has also
found that corporate hedging program
with currency derivatives enhances
firm value. However, due to difficul-
ties in measuring Tobin’s Q ratios for
1 Using the Indonesian Rupiah/US dollar floating rate data from July 1997 up to July 2002,
Suriawinata (2002) has obtained results unsupportive to the UIP (Uncovered Interest-rate Parity)
doctrine. Therefore, the results indicate that there are opportunities to exploit interest rate differentials
due to foreign exchange market inefficiencies – at least in the short term.
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Indonesian firms, Suriawinata (2004)
employs the ratio of market-to-book
value of equity as a proxy for firm
value.2
Adding to the literature of corpo-
rate hedging theories, Ross (1996) has
proposed an interesting hypothesis re-
lating to corporate hedging policy. He
argues that while hedging reduces a
firm’s financial distress costs (Smith
and Stulz 1985), at the same time hedg-
ing also increases the firm’s debt ca-
pacity; and therefore, the firm can
realize more tax benefits from the in-
creased leverage. Because it is the ex-
istence of debts that initially motivates
firms to hedge, then Ross’s (1996)
argument implies a simultaneous rela-
tionship between corporate hedging
and debt policies. Two studies on the
determinants of hedging policy within
the context of a simultaneous relation-
ship with the debt policy have been
conducted (Geczy et al. 1997; Graham
and Rogers 2002), and the results are
mixed. Employing a two-stage Logit
regression model, Geczy et al. (1997)
do not find a simultaneous relation-
ship between hedging decision using
currency derivatives and the level of
debts. On the other hand, employing a
two-stage Tobit regression model,
Graham and Rogers (2002) find a posi-
tive and significant simultaneous rela-
tionship between extent of hedging
using interest rate and currency de-
2 Varaiya et al. (1987) have shown that Tobin’s Q ratio and the market-to-book value of equity ratio
are theoretically equivalent measures of value creation, and their findings confirm that both ratios are
also empirically equivalent measures of value creation.
Figure 1. Monthly % Change in Rupiah/US Dollar Exchange Rates
January 1996 – December 2001
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rivatives and the level of debts. Hedg-
ing decision refers to whether or not a
firm hedges its financial exposure,
while extent of hedging refers to how
much notional amount of derivatives a
firm holds to hedge.
Using data from Indonesian non-
financial listed firms covering the peri-
ods of 1996-2001, this paper investi-
gates the simultaneity of corporate
hedging and debt policies. The present
study focuses on the use of foreign
currency derivatives to hedge against
the foreign exchange exposure. As can
be seen from Figure 1, the periods of
study are mostly dominated by ex-
tremely high Rupiah/US Dollar ex-
change rate volatilities that have never
occurred in the history of Indonesian
economy. Therefore, examining firms
hedging policy with currency deriva-
tives during the periods of 1996-2001
should be interesting.
This study extends previous stud-
ies, and employs both Logit and Tobit
models to investigate the simultaneity
of corporate hedging and debt poli-
cies. The Logit model is used to exam-
ine the relationship between the hedg-
ing decision and the debt policy, while
the Tobit model is used to examine the
relationship between the extent of hedg-
ing and the debt policy. Since it is
observed that many Indonesian firms
restructure their debts during the peri-
ods of 1996-2001, the present study
also investigates the effect of debt re-
structuring on corporate hedging
policy.
Theories of Hedging Motives
and Previous Empirical
Evidence
The literature on corporate hedg-
ing motives can be sub-divided into
two main streams (Tufano 1996). The
first stream focuses on hedging as a
means to maximize shareholder value
through reductions in expected tax li-
abilities, expected financial distress
costs, underinvestment costs, and as-
set substitution costs (e.g. Smith and
Stulz 1985; Froot et al. 1993; Culp
2001). While the second stream fo-
cuses on hedging as a means to maxi-
mize managerial private utility (e.g.
Stulz 1984; Smith and Stulz 1985;
DeMarzo and Duffie 1995; Breeden
and Viswanathan 1996). However,
since the present study investigates the
simultaneity of hedging and debt poli-
cies within the context of maximizing
shareholder value, the following shall
discuss only the shareholder value
maximizing motives of corporate hedg-
ing activities.
Shareholder Value Maximizing
Motives
Tax Incentive. Smith and Stulz
(1985) show that volatility is costly
when firms have convex effective tax
functions; and therefore, they argue
that firms hedge in order to reduce
expected future tax liabilities. Con-
vexity in corporate income tax arises
from: (i) progressivity in income tax
rates, (ii) tax preference treatments
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such as tax holiday, and (iii) tax loss
carry-forwards. The more convex the
effective tax function of a firm, the
more incentive it has to hedge. As an
illustration, if a firm has large tax loss
carry-forwards and it does not hedge,
then continued losses from currency
fluctuations might prevent the firm to
utilize the accumulated tax losses to
compensate future income tax liabili-
ties.3 Therefore, the tax incentive moti-
vation for hedging predicts that hedg-
ing is positively related with tax loss
carry-forwards.
Empirical evidence regarding tax
incentive is unclear. For example,
Nance et al. (1993) find moderate evi-
dence that hedging firms face more
convex tax functions. However, Tufano
(1996) and Geczy et al. (1997) do not
find supportive evidence that firms
hedge in response to tax convexity.
Graham and Rogers (2002) even find a
negative and significant (at 1%) rela-
tionship between corporate hedging
policy and tax loss carry-forwards.
This later finding contradicts the tax-
based motivation for hedging.
Expected Costs of Financial Dis-
tress. According to Smith and Stulz
(1985), hedging reduces the likelihood
of financial distress or bankruptcy, and
therefore it enhances the value of the
firm. This increase in firm value arises
from the reduction in cash flow vola-
tility which minimizes the number of
states that the hedging firm experi-
ences financial difficulty (Nguyen and
Faff 2002).
Many studies use debt ratio as an
indicator of the likelihood of financial
distress to measure expected distress
costs. Higher debt ratio indicates higher
expected financial distress costs. There-
fore, it is predicted that the relationship
between debt ratio and corporate hedg-
ing policy will be positive.
Previous empirical evidence re-
garding financial distress cost hypoth-
esis is also mixed. Nance et al. (1993)
find a positive but not significant rela-
tionship between debt ratio and corpo-
rate hedging decision. On the other
hand, Geczy et al. (1997) find a nega-
tive but not significant relationship be-
tween debt ratio and hedging decision.
However, later studies by Graham and
Rogers (2002) and Nguyen and Faff
(2002) find positive and significant
relationships between leverage and cor-
porate hedging policy.
Underinvestment Costs. Accord-
ing to Froot et al. (1993), costly exter-
nal financing is a capital market im-
perfection that makes hedging a value-
enhancing strategy. Based on pecking
order hypothesis (Myers and Majluf
1984) on preference of financing
sources, Froot et al. (1993) argue that
underinvestment costs arise if firms
find that external financing –either debt
or equity– are sufficiently expensive
that firms must reduce their invest-
ment spending during times when in-
3 Based on the Indonesian tax laws, a firm can compensate (that is to carry-forward) its current tax
losses against future tax liabilities up until five years.
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ternally generated cash-flows are not
sufficient to finance growth opportuni-
ties. The underinvestment costs repre-
sent the foregone projects’ net present
values that would otherwise accrue to
them should the internal funds were
available to finance the projects. With
hedging, firms are protected from cash-
flow volatilities, and therefore are en-
sured that sufficient internally gener-
ated cash will be available to take
advantage of profitable investment op-
portunities.
Using different proxies for invest-
ment opportunities –e.g. R&D expen-
ditures, market-to-book value of eq-
uity, and book-to-market value of eq-
uity– several studies have empirically
examined the underinvestment cost
hypothesis (Nance et al. 1993; Geczy
et al. 1997; Gay and Nam 1998;
Haushalter 2000; Graham and Rogers
2002; Nguyen and Faff 2002). Most of
those studies find evidence of a posi-
tive and significant relationship be-
tween a firm’s hedging activity using
derivatives and its investment opportu-
nities.
Asset Substitution Costs. Culp
(2001) asserts that asset substitution
costs arise because of the different
incentives faced by equity and debt
holders to take on certain investment
projects. In the presence of debt fi-
nancing, shareholders are motivated
to select riskier projects than debt-
holders are comfortable with.4 How-
ever, debt-holders recognize this op-
portunistic risk-shifting behavior on
the part of shareholders, and therefore
they impose costly debt covenants for
monitoring purposes and they usually
charge higher lending rates to the
projects. Ostensibly, increased cost of
capital will reduce the net present value
of the projects. This reduction in the
projects’ NPVs represents the asset
substitution costs arising from the
shareholders’ action of substituting less
risky projects with those of riskier
ones. However, asset substitution costs
could be substantially reduced for firms
that hedge their projects’ cash-flows.
When cash-flows of debt-funded
projects are well-hedged, debt-hold-
ers would be satisfied with less lend-
ing rates compared to those of firms
who do not hedge. With a lower cost of
capital, the pro-ject’s net present value
will increase, and so is the sharehold-
ers’ wealth.
Lookman (2005) examines the
role of hedging in mitigating the asset
substitution problem arising from the
use of bank debt by oil and gas firms in
the United States. Using a sample of
US oil and gas producers for the peri-
ods of 1999-2000, he finds that firms
4 This follows Jensen and Meckling (1976) who argued that in the presence of debt, shareholders
have a convex claim on a firm’s assets; and therefore, have incentives to increase, rather than decrease,
firm risk. In other words, shareholders transfer part of the risk to the debt-holders. That is, if the project
is successful, shareholders will reap most of the benefits; while if it is unsuccessful, debt-holders  will
bear part of the losses. Additionally, this risk-shifting problem will be more acute in firms with extremely
high leverage.
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with bank debt hedge their exposures to
commodity price risk.
Simultaneity of Corporate Hedg-
ing and Debt Policies Stulz (1996),
Ross (1996), and Leland (1998) argue
that debt financing motivates firms to
hedge, because hedging reduces cash-
flow volatility, and therefore decreases
the probability of bankruptcy and fi-
nancial distress. Reductions in the fi-
nancial distress costs due to hedging
will increase the firms’ debt capacity
(Ross 1996); and since there are tax
benefits from debt financing, firms
will be induced to borrow more to take
advantage of the potential additional
tax benefits. However, increased debt
will further increase the likelihood of
financial distress –and thus, firms will
hedge more to mitigate the increased
distress probability. In short, the above
analysis suggests that there is a simul-
taneous relationship between hedging
and debt policies; that is– hedging
increases debt capacity, and simulta-
neously debt affects hedging policy.
In fact, building on the trade-off
theory of capital structure (Castanias
1993), a reduction in the financial dis-
tress costs will lead to a greater opti-
mal leverage; and hence, more tax
benefits. Ross (1996) has demonstrated
that hedging can result in an enhanced
optimal capital structure, worth an ad-
ditional value of approximately 10-15
percent for shareholders.
Two studies are known to have
examined the simultaneous relation-
ship between corporate hedging and
debt policies, where both studies adopt
a two-stage estimation technique to
control for the simultaneity of the two
policies. Using a Logit regression
model, Geczy et al. (1997) do not find
significant relationship between the
debt policy and hedging decision.
However, by employing a Tobit re-
gression model, Graham and Rogers
(2002) have found that hedging in-
creases debt capacity, and simulta-
neously debt also affects hedging
policy. Using simultaneous system of
equations, Graham and Rogers (2002)
test whether the extent of hedging af-
fects the debt ratio, while Geczy et al.
(1997) test whether the probability of
hedging affects the debt ratio. With
their findings, Graham and Rogers
(2002) claim that it is not the yes/no
decision of whether to hedge, but rather
how much a firm hedges, that affects
the level of debts.
Methodology
Samples
The initial sample includes all In-
donesian non-financial firms listed in
the Jakarta Stock Exchange in any year
within the periods of 1996-2001. How-
ever, to be included in the final sample,
a firm must:
(i) have a complete set of audited
financial statements including the
notes to financial statements,
(ii) have a foreign currency exposure
arising from imported raw materi-
als, export sales, assets or liabili-
ties in foreign currencies, or have
foreign subsidiaries,
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(iii) have an adequate disclosure on
foreign currency liabilities,
(iv) maintain accounting records in
Rupiah currency, and
(v) have a positive book value of eq-
uity at year end.
Imposing these criteria yields a
total of 1007 firm-year observations
from 229 firms.5 Information about
corporate hedging with foreign cur-
rency derivatives is obtained from notes
to financial statements where it is found
that 245 firm-year observations report
foreign currency derivatives usage -
such as currency forwards, futures,
swaps, and options. However, only
225 firm-year observations report the
notional amount of foreign currency
derivatives held.6 All cross-sectional
units (N firms) are pooled by year (T
years), and multiple regression analy-
ses are then applied to the pooled data
to investigate the simultaneity of the
corporate hedging and the capital struc-
ture policies. Hence, the present study
employs a data structure called pooled
cross sections over time.7 Following
Wooldridge (2002), this approach as-
sumes that every year a new random
sample is taken from the relevant popu-
lation.8 However, to control the time
effects, the present study includes year
dummies in its multiple regression mod-
els, where the year 1996 is used as the
basis or benchmark year.9
Hypothesis and Empirical Model
Following Ross (1996), it is hy-
pothesized that corporate hedging and
debt policies are simultaneously de-
5  Firms do not have equal number of observations due to new listing, delisting, or failing to meet
the sampling criteria in certain years.
6 Prior to the stipulation of PSAK No. 59 Tahun 1999 which obliges firms to report their derivatives
holdings, disclosure of derivatives usage is voluntary. Although many sample firms disclose the notional
amount of their derivatives holdings, yet there are some firms that report the usage of currency
derivatives but not the notional amount. All firms in the sample state that they hold foreign currency
derivatives to hedge against foreign exchange exposure.
7 An alternative approach is to use a panel data set up, where the same sample firms are followed
over time, and the data will be structured in blocks of observation, either of T for a given firm i or N for
a given year t. However, since firms do not have equal number of observations, then an unbalanced panel
data is obtained. While estimating an unbalanced panel data is possible (Green  2002, 2003), it also
introduces an attrition bias which is rather complicated to handle (Wooldridge 2002). On the other hand,
imposing a balanced panel data would significantly reduce the sample size.
 To avoid the loss of many valuable information on firms’ hedging activities, a pooled data approach
with some restrictive assumptions is applied. Therefore, the results of this study should be interpreted
by taking into account those restrictive assumptions.
8 If sample firms appear more than one time period, their recurrence are treated as coincidental and
ignored. In short, if a sample firm does appear in each and every year during the periods of 1996-2001,
then the observations will be regarded as 6 different and independent firms. Wooldridge (2002) provides
good discussion that contrasts the pooling of cross section over time approach with that of the panel data.
9 The use of year dummies is basically similar to conducting the Chow test on the pooled data (see
Gujarati 2003: 306-310).
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termined. To examine the simultaneity
of corporate hedging and debt policies,
the present study constructs a system
of structural equations consisting of
hedging policy equation and debt policy
equation. The present study follows
both Geczy et al. (1997) and Graham
and Rogers (2002) methodologies in
investigating the simultaneity of cor-
porate hedging and debt policies, and
therefore uses both Logit and Tobit
regression models to examine corpo-
rate hedging policy. The Logit regres-
sion is used to examine the hedging
decision (yes/no decision), while the
Tobit regression is used to examine the
extent of hedging.10
The debt specification used by the
present study adopts explanatory vari-
ables suggested by Titman and Wessels
(1988), Geczy et al. (1997), and
Hovakimian et al. (2001). Following
Geczy et al. (1997) and Graham and
Rogers (2002), the debt equation is
estimated by using the OLS method.
Corporate Hedging Policy
The present study develops two
hedging policy multiple regressions:
the Logit regression to estimate the
hedging decision equation, and the Tobit
regression to estimate the extent of
hedging equation. As the dependent
variables, the study employs two mea-
sures of corporate hedging policy
(HEDGING) variables, i.e.: (i) dummy
hedging (D_HEDGE) to represent the
decision to hedge in the Logit regres-
sion, and (ii) the total notional amount
of foreign currency derivatives con-
tract divided by total assets
(TOT_HEDGE) to represent the ex-
tent of hedging in the Tobit regression.
The followings list the various in-
dependent variables used in the Logit
and Tobit regressions and describe their
hypothesized relationships with the
dependent variables (D_HEDGE and
TOT_HEDGE) of each regression.
Leverage (DEBT_MVE) is the inde-
pendent variable of interest, while other
independent variables act as control
variables.
(a) Tax-Loss Carry Forward
(TAXLOSS): Firms hedge in order
to reduce expected tax liabilities,
and the more convex the tax sched-
ule is, the larger the incentive for
firms to hedge. The present study
uses tax-loss carry forwards di-
vided by market value of equity to
proxy tax incentive, and predicts a
positive relationship between tax-
loss carry forwards and corporate
hedging policy.
(b) Leverage (DEBT_MVE): Firms
hedge in order to reduce expected
costs of financial distress and bank-
ruptcy. Higher leverage indicates
higher expected costs of distress,
and therefore it is predicted that
higher leverage will lead to more
incentive to hedge. Leverage is
proxied by total interest-bearing
debt divided by the market value of
equity.
10 The Tobit model is used because the extent of hedging (represented by the notional amount of
currency derivatives holding divided by total assets) is censored at zero.
188
Gadjah Mada International Journal of Business, May-August 2005, Vol. 7, No. 2
(c) Investment Opportunities (BME):
Froot et al. (1993) argue that firms
that have potential investment op-
portunities will be motivated to
hedge to ensure the availability of
internal cash-flows to fund future
investments. On the other hand,
firms with no growth opportunities
will be less motivated to hedge.
Similar to Nance et al. (1993),
Geczy et al. (1997) and Graham
and Rogers (2002), this study uses
book-to-market value of equity ra-
tio as a proxy for growth opportu-
nities. Larger book-to-market value
of equity ratio means lesser growth
opportunities. Therefore, this study
predicts a negative relationship
between the book-to-market value
of equity ratio with corporate hedg-
ing policy.
(d) Business Risk (V_ROA): This
study employs volatility of return
on assets –defined as the volatility
of EBIT to total assets– as a mea-
sure of business risk. Higher busi-
ness risk implies higher asset sub-
stitution costs, and it is predicted
that volatility of return on assets is
positively related with corporate
hedging policy.
(e) Liquidity (LIQUID_TL): Firms
may use substitutes for hedging to
manage risk. For example, firms
with more liquid assets will be less
likely to face financial distress
(Geczy et al. 1997). Therefore, it is
predicted that liquid assets are nega-
tively related with corporate hedg-
ing policy. The present study uses
the ratio of liquid assets11 to total
liabilities as a proxy for hedging
substitute.
(f) Foreign Exchange Exposure
(FCL_TA): Obviously, firms hold
currency derivatives to hedge
against foreign exchange exposure.
This study uses the ratio of foreign
currency denominated liabilities
divided by total assets to proxy
foreign exchange exposure, and
predicts a positive relationship be-
tween foreign exchange exposure
with corporate hedging policy.
(g) Firm Size (SIZE_TA): Previous
empirical studies provide evidence
that firm size is positively related
with corporate hedging policy, in-
dicating the existence of economies
of scale in hedging costs (Nance et
al. 1993; Mian 1996; Geczy et al.
1997; Graham and Rogers 2002).
Similar to past research, this study
uses natural logarithm of total as-
sets as a proxy of firm size, and
predicts a positive relationship be-
tween firm size and corporate hedg-
ing policy.
(h) Debt Restructuring (D_RES
TRU): The existence of debt re-
structuring indicates severe finan-
cial distress. It is well known that
the option value of equity increases
as the probability of financial dis-
11 In this study, liquid assets consisted of: cash and cash equivalents, trade receivables, and note
receivables.
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tress increases. Because the option
value of equity of distressed firms
will increase as cash-flows volatil-
ity increases, then it would be for
the best interest of such firms if
they do not hedge.12 The present
study uses a dummy variable for
debt restructuring; that is a firm
will be assigned a value of 1 if it is
restructuring its debt, and 0 other-
wise. It is predicted that debt re-
structuring is negatively related
with corporate hedging policy.
(i) Interaction Variables: To account
for any interaction effects, the
present study includes two interac-
tion variables, i.e. D_RESTRU*
DEBT_MVE and D_RESTRU*
SIZE_TA in the corporate hedging
policy equations. However, the
present study does not provide any
prediction on the directions of the
relationships between the interac-
tion variables and corporate hedg-
ing policy.
Debt Policy Equation
The dependent variable of the debt
policy equation is the total interest-
bearing debt divided by the market
value of equity. The two measures of
corporate hedging policy (i.e.
D_HEDGE and TOT_HEDGE) are
the independent variables of interest,
while other independent variables act
as control variables. The list of all
independent variables and their hypoth-
esized relationships with the dependent
variable are as follows:
(a) Hedging (D_HEDGE or
TOT_HEDGE): Ross (1996) as-
serts that hedging increases debt
capacity. Therefore, it is predicted
that hedging using foreign currency
derivatives is positively related with
debt.
(b) Selling and General Administra-
tion Expenses (SGA): Adopting
Titman and Wessels (1988), SGA
represents firm uniqueness. Since
uniqueness is negatively related
with leverage, the present study
predicts a negative relationship
between SGA and debt.
(c) Growth opportunities (BME):
According to Titman and Wessels
(1988), growth opportunities are
capital assets that add value to a
firm but cannot be collateralized.
Firms with high growth opportuni-
ties are expected to have less debt,
and vice versa. Higher book-to-
market value of equity (BME)
means lower growth opportunities;
therefore, the present study pre-
dicts a positive relationship be-
12 Hedging reduces volatility, and based on Black and Scholes (1973) option pricing formula, a
reduction in the volatility of the value of underlying asset decreases the option value. Total asset is the
underlying asset, while debt is the exercise price. Debt restructuring implies that total asset is potentially
insufficient to pay debt, therefore it would be better for shareholders of a distressed firm to expose their
firm’s assets to currency fluctuations to increase the probability that total assets will exceed debt at
maturity. If this is the case, then shareholders would keep the firm; otherwise, shareholders would lose
nothing as their firm is already at the mercy of debt-holders.
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tween the book-to-market value of
equity and debt.
(d) Profitability (ROA): Following
Myers and Majluf (1984), firms
with higher profitability will be
relying less on debt to finance their
investment activities. Therefore, it
is predicted that profitability is
negatively related with leverage.
The present study uses return on
assets –measured by EBIT divided
by total assets– as a proxy for
profitability.
(e) Firm Size (SIZE_TA): Titman and
Wessel (1988) state that large firms
tend to be more diversified and less
prone to bankruptcy. Therefore,
larger firms are predicted to be
highly leveraged. In this study, firm
size is proxied by natural loga-
rithm of total assets.
(f) Asset Tangibility (TANG): Asset
tangibility affects the amount of
debt that could be obtained by a
firm because creditors generally
rely on tangible assets as debt
collaterals. The present study uses
the ratio of net fixed asset-to-mar-
ket value of equity as a proxy for
asset tangibility, and predicts a
positive relationship between asset
tangibility and debt levels.
(g) Debt Restructuring (D_RES
TRU): The present study argues
that firms that restructure their
debts must already have relatively
much higher debt ratios, otherwise
such firms would not embark debt
restructuring programs. Therefore,
the present study predicts a posi-
tive relationship between the oc-
currence of debt restructuring
(dummy debt restructuring) and
debt levels.
Previous discussions suggest that
hedging can increase debt capacity,
and simultaneously debt can affect
hedging policy. Therefore, following
Geczy, Minton, and Schrand (1997)
and Graham and Rogers (2002), to
investigate the simultaneity of the hedg-
ing decision and the debt policy, this
study employs a two-stage estimation
technique on the structural equations
which consisted of: corporate hedging
policy equation (Logit and Tobit Re-
gressions):
HEDGING
it
= 
1
 +  jD_YRj +

1
TAXLOSS
it
 +

2
DEBT_MVF
it
 +

3
BME
it
 + 
4
V_ROA
it
 +

5
LIQUID_TL
it 
 +

6
FCL_TA
it 
 +

7
SIZE_TA
it
 +

8
D_RESTRU
it
 +

9
D_RESTRU
it
 *
DEBT_MVF
it
 +

10
D_RESTRU
it
 *
SIZE_TA
it
 + 
it 
.........(1)
Debt policy equation (OLS Re-
gression):
2001
j=1997
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Table 1. The Hypothesized Relationships between the Dependent Variables
and the Independent Variables of the Corporate Hedging and the
Debt Policies
Hedging Debt
Policy Policy
Independent Variables Dependent Variables
D_HEDGE {1,0}
and DEBT_MVE
TOT_HEDGE
Tax Loss Carry-Forwards (TAXLOSS) +
Predicted Value of Debt Ratio (DEBT_MVF) +
Book-to-Market Value of Equity (BME) - +
Volatility of Return on Assets (V_ROA) +
Hedging Substitute  (LIQUID_TL) -
Debt Restructurization (D_RESTRU) {1,0} - +
Foreign Currency Liabilities-to-Total Assets (FCL_TA) +
DEBT_MVE
it
=
1
 +  jD_YRj +

1
HEDGINGF
it
 +

2
SGA
it
 + 
3
BME
it
 +

4
ROA
it 
+
 

5
SIZE_TA
it 
+

7
TANG
it
 +

8
D_RESTRU
it
 + 
it 
...(2)
The multiple regression in Equa-
tion (1) are estimated using two meth-
ods, i.e. (i) the Logit method to exam-
ine the hedging decision, and (ii) the
Tobit method to examine the extent of
hedging. For the Logit regression,
HEDGING is a binary variable, where
it will be assigned a value of 1 (D_
2001
j=1997
HEDGE= 1) if an examination on the
notes to financial statements reveals
that the firm uses any currency deriva-
tives such as forwards, futures, swaps
or options for hedging purposes; and
will be assigned a value of 0 (D_
HEDGE=0) otherwise. In the Tobit
regression, HEDGING is the extent of
hedging (represented by TOT_HEDGE
–defined as the notional amount of
foreign currency derivatives holding
divided by total assets) and is censored
at zero.
It must be noted that the above
equations are the second-stage equa-
tions; where DEBT_MVF is the pre-
dicted value of the debt ratio obtained
from the first-stage estimation of the
debt policy equation, and HEDGINGF
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is the predicted value of D_HEDGE
and TOT_HEDGE from the first-stage
estimation of the hedging decision equa-
tion (Logit regression) and the extent of
hedging equation (Tobit regression)
respectively. The present study assumes
constant coefficients over time, but dif-
ferent intercept for each year.13 To
account for year effects, dummy years
(D_YR97 up to D_YR01) are included
in both corporate hedging and debt
equations, where the year 1996 is used
as a basis or benchmark year.14 Table 1
summarizes the hypothesized relation-
ships between the dependent variables
and the independent variables for both
hedging and debt equations.
Results
Table 2 reports correlations among
the independent variables of both hedg-
ing and debt equations. Of particular
interest is the positive and significant
correlation between corporate hedg-
ing policy (D_HEDGE and TOT_
HEDGE) and firm size (SIZE_TA),
indicating the importance of firm size
in corporate hedging policy. Also, it
can be seen that corporate hedging
policy is negatively correlated with
debt restructuring (D_RESTRU),
which implies that distressed firms are
less motivated to hedge because the
option values of their equity will in-
crease as volatility increases. There-
fore, such firms will be better-off with-
out hedging. Another interesting ob-
servation is the negative correlation
between profitability (ROA) and debt
restructuring (D_RESTRU). This
means that profitable firms are less
likely to restructure their debts.
From Table 2, it can also be ob-
served that there is no correlation coef-
ficient that exceeds 0.8. As a rule of
thumb, for a model involving only two
independent variables, a correlation
coefficient in excess of 0.8 may sug-
gest a serious collinearity problem
(Judge et al. 1988; Gujarati 2003).
However, the rule will not provide a
reliable guide if the model involves
more than two independent variables,
as in the case with the present study.
Therefore, a more reliable diagnostic
tool called Variance Inflating Factor
(VIF) should be consulted. Table 3
13 Since it has been assumed that each observation represents a different and independent unit (see
Note 8), no additional assumptions are needed about the intercept and coefficient of each cross sectional
unit.
14 To avoid the dummy variable trap, a dummy is assigned only for each year covering 1997 to 2001,
whereas the year 1996 is used as the base or benchmark year. Therefore, the intercept a
1 
and j
1 
represents
the mean value of the benchmark category –that is the year 1996– for equations  (1) and (2) respectively.
The coefficients (d
j 
 and l
j
) associated with each D_YR
j
 are the differential intercept coefficients, and
they show by how much the value of the intercept for each year j (year 1997 up to 2001) differs from
the intercept coefficient of the benchmark year (i.e. year 1996).
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reports the values of the VIF for all the
independent variables, and none indi-
cates any presence of a serious multi-
collinearity problem.15
 Table 4 presents the results of the
simultaneous equations analysis of cor-
porate hedging and debt policies relat-
ing to both the hedging decision and the
extent of hedging. Panel A reports the
estimated coefficients of the hedging
policy equations, while Panel B reports
those of the debt policy equations. As
mentioned above, a two-stage estima-
tion technique is employed for the si-
multaneous equations analysis. In the
first stage, both hedging policy regres-
sion and debt policy regression are
performed16 to obtain the predicted
values of the corporate hedging vari-
ables (D_HEDGEF and TOT_
HEDGEF) and the predicted value of
debt-to-market value of equity ratio
Table 2. Pearson Correlations – Independent Variables
Panel A – Corporate Hedging Policy Equation
TAXLOSS DEBT_MVE BME V_ROA LIQ_TL FCL_TA SIZE_TA D_RESTRU
TAXLOSS -1.000 -0.267 ** -0.214 ** -0.045 -0.051 -0.250 ** -0.086 ** -0.343 **
DEBT_MVE -1.000 -0.282 ** -0.040 -0.070 * -0.277 ** -0.099 ** -0.191 **
BME -1.000 -0.034 -0.057 -0.020 -0.045 -0.041
V_ROA -1.000 -0.073 * -0.096 ** -0.217 ** -0.145 **
LIQ_TL -1.000 -0.198 ** -0.145 ** -0.138 **
FCL_TA -1.000 -0.266 ** -0.359 **
SIZE_TA -1.000 -0.262 **
D_RESTRU -1.000
Panel B – Debt Policy Equation
D_HEDGE TOT_HEDGE SGA BME ROA SIZE_TA TANG D_RESTRU
D_HEDGE -1.000 -0.652 ** -0.030 -0.060 -0.014 -0.293 ** -0.020 -0.128 **
TOT_HEDGE -1.000 -0.012 -0.016 -0.039 -0.193 ** -0.078 * -0.090 **
SGA -1.000 -0.131 ** -0.116 ** -0.240 ** -0.183 ** -0.184 **
BME -1.000 -0.093 ** -0.045 -0.489 ** -0.041
ROA -1.000 -0.006 -0.159 ** -0.172 **
SIZE_TA -1.000 -0.180 ** -0.262 **
TANG -1.000- -0.251 **
D_RESTRU -1.000
**, * Significant respectively under 1 percent, and under 5 percent
15 Variance Inflating Factor (VIF) measures the effect of the intercorrelation of the independent
variables on the variances of the regression coefficient estimators. As a general rule, if the VIF of a
variable exceeds 10, then the variable is said to be highly collinear (Gujarati 2003); though there are
others who suggest 30 or 40 as a benchmark value (Greene 2003).
16 To save space, the results of the first-stage regression are not reported here.
194
Gadjah Mada International Journal of Business, May-August 2005, Vol. 7, No. 2
Panel B – Debt Policy Equation
Independent Variance Variance
Variable Inflating Factor Inflating Factor
(Hedging Decision) (Extent of Hedging)
D_HEDGE 1.16320 ——
TOT_HEDGE —— 1.07644
SGA 1.12078 1.11386
BME 1.36613 1.36614
ROA 1.06053 1.06351
SIZE_TA 1.31664 1.22026
TANG 1.47787 1.48677
D_RESTRU 1.22417 1.20112
Table 3. Variance Inflating Factors (VIF)
Panel A – Corporate Hedging Policy Equation
Independent Variance
Variable Inflating Factor
TAXLOSS 1.23879
DEBT_MVE 1.21743
BME 1.13371
V_ROA 1.06229
LIQ_TL 1.06027
FCL_TA 1.29642
SIZE_TA 1.16566
D_RESTRU 1.30671
Table 4. Simultaneous Equations Analysis of Corporate Hedging and Debt
Policies – Pooled Data
Panel A. Corporate Hedging Policy Equation
Independent Variables Predicted LOGIT Regression TOBIT Regression
Sign (Decision to Hedge) (Extent of Hedging)
Coefficient (p-value) Coefficient (p-value)
Estimate Estimate
Dependent Variable: Dependent Variable:
D_HEDGE {1,0} TOT_HEDGE
INTERCEPT ? -12.6826 0.0000 *** -1.7113 0.0000 ***
D_YR97 ? 0.3112 0.2214 0.1144 0.0089 ***
D_YR98 ? -0.7330 0.0233 ** -0.0522 0.3480
D_YR99 ? -0.1947 0.5506 -0.0399 0.4932
D_YR00 ? -1.0718 0.0021 *** -0.1847 0.0048 ***
D_YR01 ? -0.8612 0.0129 ** -0.1407 0.0285 **
TAXLOSS + -7.6965 0.0112 ** -4.3347 0.0004 ***
DEBT_MVF + 1.8070 0.0056 *** 0.2123 0.0013 ***
BME - -2.6188 0.0118 ** -0.4305 0.0017 ***
V_ROA + 3.1453 0.0158 ** 0.3148 0.2995
LIQUID_TL - -0.2197 0.1214 -0.0432 0.1122
FCL_TA + 1.1384 0.0038 *** 0.2817 0.0000 ***
SIZE_TA + 0.5719 0.0000 *** 0.0727 0.0000 ***
D_RESTRU {1,0} - -12.0639 0.0062 *** -2.9284 0.0004 ***
D_RESTRU*DEBT_MVF ? -1.2624 0.0545 * 0.0983 0.2204
D_RESTRU*SIZE_TA ? 0.5282 0.0105 ** 0.1313 0.0007 ***
Heteroscedasticity Term
TAXLOSS ? 2.8535 0.0000 ***
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Continued from Table 4
Independent Variables Predicted LOGIT Regression TOBIT Regression
Sign (Decision to Hedge) (Extent of Hedging)
Coefficient (p-value) Coefficient (p-value)
Estimate Estimate
Dependent Variable: Dependent Variable:
D_HEDGE {1,0} TOT_HEDGE
Log Likelihood -426.2261 -287.4561
LR Statistic 265.0167 279.1735
Probability (LR stat) 0.0000 0.0000
McFadden R-Squared 0.2372 0.3269
p-value of Ljung-Box Q-stat (10 lags)0.8150 0.6640
p-values of Chi-Square Statistic:
     - Hosmer-Lemeshow Statistic 0.8318 ——
     - Andrews Statistic 0.2552 ——
Prediction Accuracy 79.34% ——
Number of Observations 1007 1007
     - Obs with Dep=0 (Non-Hedgers) 762 782
     - Obs with Dep>0 (Hedgers) 245 225
Panel B. Debt Policy Equation
Independent Variables Predicted OLS OLS
Sign Regression Regression
Coefficient (p-value) Coefficient (p-value)
Estimate Estimate
Dependent Variable: Dependent Variable:
D_HEDGE {1,0} TOT_HEDGE
INTERCEPT ? 1.2108 0.0111 ** 0.6055 0.1133
D_YR97 ? -0.0895 0.2154 -0.0825 0.2752
D_YR98 ? 0.0534 0.5026 0.0005 0.9944
D_YR99 ? -0.1114 0.1479 -0.1354 0.0757 *
D_YR00 ? 0.0099 0.9048 -0.0568 0.4627
D_YR01 ? -0.0293 0.7175 -0.0944 0.2097
D_HEDGEF + 0.6195 0.0027 *** — —
TOT_HEDGEF + — — 1.1471 0.0319 **
SGA - 0.0139 0.9305 -0.0357 0.8224
BME + 0.2433 0.1318 0.2006 0.2110
ROA - -0.1444 0.4548 -0.1738 0.3684
SIZE_TA + 0.0654 0.0136 ** -0.0283 0.1580
TANG + 0.9606 0.0000 *** 0.9673 0.0000 ***
D_RESTRU {1,0} + 0.2281 0.0001 *** 0.1820 0.0011 ***
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(DEBT_MVF) respectively. In the sec-
ond stage, D_HEDGEF,  TOT_
HEDGEF, and DEBT_MVF are then
used (instead of their original values)
as independent variables in the debt
policy regression and the hedging policy
regression.
The results of the second stage
regressions are presented in Table 4.
However, before discussing them, it
would be useful to investigate whether
there are potential econometric prob-
lems that may weaken the results. The
present study focuses on the potential
problems of autocorrelation, hetero-
scedasticity, and model specification
errors.
Based on Ljung-Box Q-stats (us-
ing 10 lags), no autocorrelation prob-
lems are detected for both hedging (Logit
and Tobit) and debt (OLS) regression
models. Panel B of Table 4 also reports
that the Durbin-Watson stats for both
debt (OLS) equations involving hedg-
ing decision and extent of hedging are
in the neighborhood of 2, which value
indicates that there is no first-order
autocorrelation in the error terms, ei-
ther positive or negative (Gujarati
2003).
Even though OLS estimates are
still consistent in the presence of
heteroscedasticity, the conventional
computed standard errors are no longer
valid, which will cause conclusions
from conventionally employed t and F
tests to be misleading. White Hetero-
scedasticity Test is a test of the null
hypothesis of no heteroscedasticity
against heteroscedasticity of some un-
known general form. Panel B of Table
4 reports high probability values of
Continued from Table 4
Panel B. Debt Policy Equation (Continued)
Independent Variables Predicted OLS OLS
Sign Regression Regression
Coefficient (p-value) Coefficient (p-value)
Estimate Estimate
Dependent Variable: Dependent Variable:
D_HEDGE {1,0} TOT_HEDGE
R-squared 0.3009 0.2978
Adjusted R-squared 0.2924 0.2893
p-value of Ljung-Box Q-stat (10 lags)0.9910 0.9960
Durbin-Watson stat 2.0271 2.0234
Regression F-statistic 35.6504 35.1300
p-value of F-statistic 0.0000 0.0000
p-value of Ramsey RESET F-stat 0.2336 0.1437
p-value of White Het F-stat 0.8352 0.8132
***, **, * Significant for respectively under 1 percent, under 5 percent and under 10%
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White’s F-tests, which mean that the
null hypothesis of no heteroscedasticity
cannot be rejected. Therefore, both debt
specifications are homoscedastic.
Employing a Lagrange multiplier
test, a multiplicative heteroscedasticity
(Greene 2002) caused by TAXLOSS
is found in the Tobit regression model.
Therefore, the Tobit (extent of hedg-
ing) equation is estimated by correcting
for the heteroscedasticity. However,
by employing a similar procedure, the
present study does not find any
heteroscedasticity problem in the Logit
(hedging decision) equation.
With regard to model specifica-
tion errors, the Logit results indicate no
specification errors as shown by rela-
tively high probability values of
Hosmer-Lemeshow and Andrews test
statistics. For the Tobit model, the pa-
rameter estimates will be inconsistent
in the presence heteroscedasticity and
non-normal errors (Greene 2003, Long
1997). The problem of hetero-
scedasticity has been corrected and dis-
cussed in the previous paragraph, but
research is still ongoing in handling the
problem of non-normal errors (Greene
2002).17
17 One solution is to use an alternative error distribution (Greene 2002). Employing an alternative
error distribution, i.e. extreme value, the author  finds that the results are more or less similar with the
results that assume normal errors. However, the results are not reported here.
Figure 2. Testing the Stability of the Coefficients of Debt Policy Equation
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Panel B of Table 4 reports that the
probability values of the Ramsey’s
RESET F tests for both OLS regres-
sions are above the significance level
of 5 percent, and therefore the results
indicate that both debt equations are
not mis-specified. Additionally, to test
the stability of the debt policy equa-
tion, a CUSUM test is conducted. As
can be seen from Figure 2, the null
hypothesis of coefficient stability can-
not be rejected. Since the results of all
the above diagnostic tests are more or
less satisfactory, the followings will
then discuss the results of the esti-
mated hedging and debt policies equa-
tions.
By examining the sign (whether
positive or negative) and the statistical
significance of the estimated coeffi-
cients of the Logit regression, it can be
said that generally the results support
the view that firms hedge in order to
enhance or increase shareholder value.
To be more specific, it can be con-
cluded that firms hedge in order to
reduce financial distress costs
(DEBT_MVF), minimize underinvest-
ment costs (BME), and alleviate asset
substitution problems (V_ROA). How-
ever, the results do not provide support
for the tax incentive (TAXLOSS) hy-
pothesis. Graham and Rogers (2002)
argue that a significant large amount of
accumulated tax losses –as in the case
of many Indonesian firms during the
crisis periods– represents financial dis-
tress rather than future potential tax
Figure 3. The Effect of Debt Restructuring on the Estimated Probability of
Hedging in Relation to the Predicted Debt Ratio
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
0.0 0.4 0.8 1.2 1.6 2.0 2.4 2.8 3.2
Predicted Debt-to-Market Value of Equity Ratio
E
st
im
at
ed
 P
ro
ba
bi
li
ty
 o
f 
H
ed
g
in
g
Without Debt Restructuring
With Debt Restructuring
199
Suriawinata—Investigating the Simultaneity of Corporate Hedging and Debt Policies
saving. Therefore, this later finding
actually supports the view that dis-
tressed firms are less motivated to hedge.
The results of the Logit regression
also show that corporate hedging deci-
sion is: (i) positively related with firm
size (SIZE_TA), (ii) negatively related
with liquid assets (LIQUID_TL) -
though not statistically significant, (iii)
positively related with foreign ex-
change exposure (FCL_TA), and (iv)
negatively related with debt restruc-
turing (D_RESTRU). The estimated
coefficients of the two interaction
variables (D_RESTRU*DEBT_MVF
and D_RESTRU*SIZE_TA) reveal
that firms which debts are being re-
structured tend not to hedge, but large
firms which debts are being restruc-
tured tend to hedge. Figure 3 shows the
relationship between the probability of
corporate hedging using foreign cur-
rency derivatives with the predicted
value of debt ratio –with and without
debt restructuring.18
Panel A of Table 4 also reports the
results of the Tobit regression that has
been corrected for heteroscedasticity
caused by the ratio of tax-loss carry
forwards-to-market value of equity
(TAXLOSS). By comparing the re-
sults of both Logit and Tobit regres-
sions, with the exceptions of two inde-
pendent variables (V_ROA and
D_RESTRU*DEBT_MVF), it can be
said that generally the independent
variables have similar impacts on the
corporate hedging decision as well as
on the extent of hedging. From the
Logit and Tobit results, it can be seen
that the volatility of earnings (V_ROA)
determines firms’ decision to hedge,
but does not determine the notional
amount of foreign currency deriva-
tives held by firms for hedging pur-
poses. Also, while the interaction vari-
able D_RESTRU*DEBT_MVF signi-
ficantly and negatively affects firms’
decision to hedge, the same variable
has a positive but not significant effect
on the extent of corporate hedging
using foreign currency derivatives.
Panel B of Table 4 reports the
results of OLS regression for the debt
policy equation. It is interesting to
note that the independent variables
found to have significant effects on the
corporate debt policy are limited only
to: (i) corporate hedging policy
(D_HEDGEF and TOT_HEDGEF),
(ii) firm size (SIZE_TA),19 (iii) asset
tangibility (TANG), and (iv) debt re-
structuring (D_RESTRU). As pre-
dicted, debt levels are positively re-
lated with asset tangibility. The results
also confirm that firms which debts are
being restructured tend to have higher
debt levels. However, the present find-
ing that firm size is negatively related
with leverage is in contradiction with
previous findings (e.g. Hovakimian et
18 Using mean values for other independent variables.
19 However, firm size (SIZE_TA) is not statistically significant in the debt policy equation relating
to the extent of hedging.
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al. 2001). One plausible explanation is
that during the periods of study –cover-
ing the periods of economic crisis– all
firms tend to reduce their debt levels to
avoid detrimental effects of rising in-
terest rates. However, due to their abil-
ity to raise necessary funds to repay
debt, it is argued that only larger firms
that are capable of successfully reduc-
ing their debt levels. Therefore, the
present study finds that larger firms
tend to have lower leverage.
Of significant interest is that the
results of the debt policy equation show
that both the hedging decision
(D_HEDGEF) and the extent of hedg-
ing using foreign currency derivatives
(TOT_HEDGEF) are important fac-
tors in the determination of corporate
debt level (significant at 1% and 5%
respectively). And since Panel A of
Table 4 has already shown that the
predicted debt level (DEBT_MVF) af-
fects both corporate hedging decision
and extent of hedging (significant at
1% for both Logit and Tobit regres-
sions), the results of the present study
have provided empirical evidence on
the simultaneity of corporate hedging
and debt policies. In the present study -
unlike those of previous results (i.e.
Geczy et al. 1997; Graham and Rogers
2002), the evidence of simultaneity with
the debt policy is found for both the
hedging decision and the extent of hedg-
ing.
Summary and Conclusion
It is believed that many Indone-
sian firms employ foreign currency
debts in order to exploit interest rate
differentials arising from the short-
term foreign exchange market ineffi-
ciencies. However, realizing that such
funding strategy would expose firms
to foreign exchange rates volatility,
many Indonesian firms mitigate the
exposure by using foreign currency
derivative instruments, such as cur-
rency forwards, futures, swaps, and
options. The primary focus of the
present study is to investigate the si-
multaneity of corporate hedging and
debt policies. It is argued that firms
hedge in order to reduce the probabil-
ity of financial distress arising from
debts; however, reduced probability
of financial distress will increase firms’
debt capacity and will induce them to
increase their debt levels to take ad-
vantage of the tax benefits of debts.
Therefore, a simultaneous relationship
between corporate hedging and debt
policies is hypothesized.
Using a pooled sample of Indone-
sian non-financial listed firms covering
the periods of 1996-2001, the present
study finds evidence that corporate
hedging and debt policies are simulta-
neously determined. That is, the pres-
ence of debts motivates firms to hedge;
but hedging also increases firms’ debt
capacity. There are also other impor-
tant findings. The results of the present
study show that Indonesian firms hedge
in order to enhance shareholder value
through reductions in financial distress
and underinvest-ment costs, and alle-
viation of asset substitution problems.
The positive relationship between firm
size and corporate hedging activities
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found in this study means that –com-
pared to those of smaller ones– larger
firms are more likely to hedge. While
this finding might support the conten-
tion of the existence of economies of
scale in hedging costs (Nance et al.
1993; Mian 1996; Geczy et al. 1997;
Graham and Rogers 2002), another
plausible explanation is that larger firms
may have more access to currency de-
rivative instruments.20 Last but not least,
the finding that distressed firms –as
indicated by their debt restructuring
programs– are less motivated to hedge
is consistent with the view that levered
equity is an option held by shareholders
against the firm’s assets where the value
of debt is the exercise price. Finan-
cially distressed firms will see that the
option values of their equity will in-
crease as their cash-flow volatilities
increase. Therefore, such firms tend
not to hedge; or at least, hedge lesser
compared to those of firms that do not
experience financial distress.
Limitations and Future
Research
The present study imposes two
important assumptions. Firstly, it is
assumed that observations are drawn
from annual random sampling, and each
observation drawn is regarded as a
different and independent firm. Sec-
ondly, the regression coefficients esti-
mated in the present study are assumed
to be constant over time. These two
assumptions may be regarded as too
restrictive. Therefore, the results of
this study should be interpreted with all
these restrictive assumptions in mind.
Also, data limitation and unknown
potential attrition bias have prevented
the present study to confidently employ
a panel data approach that could pro-
vide many opportunities to explore both
individual firm as well as time effects
on the simultaneity of corporate hedg-
ing and debt policies. It is hoped that
with more data and better financial
statement disclosures, a balanced panel
data approach for studying corporate
hedging policy would be possible in the
near future; and therefore, richer analy-
ses and conclusions could be obtained.21
Lastly, other limitation worth men-
tioning is that considering the pecu-
liarities of the Indonesian macro-eco-
nomic conditions during the study pe-
riods of 1996 through 2001, the results
of this study might not be extendable
to periods beyond the year 2001.22 The
20 Further examination reveals that large sample firms obtain currency derivative instruments
through OTC markets involving some large reputable global financial institutions such as Credit Suisse
First Boston, Morgan Stanley, Standard Chartered, Citibank, or Sumitomo Bank. It is doubted that
smaller firms would have as equal access as their larger counterparts to such financial institutions.
21 Nevertheless, the author has conducted unreported analyses where the results show that neither
an unbalanced panel data approach nor relaxing the assumption of constant coefficient changes the
hedging-debt simultaneity conclusion drawn by the present study.
22 Due to lack of adequate financial statement disclosures, conducting a study on Indonesian firms’
hedging policy prior to year 1996 would be difficult, if not impossible.
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Rupiah exchange rates during periods
subsequent to year 2001 are seen to be
less volatile, and there is also a sort of
widely held believe within the business
community that the Rupiah currency
would appreciate as the Indonesian
economic and political climates start to
improve. It is asserted that if firms
believe that the Rupiah exchange rate
would appreciate, they might opt not to
hedge their currency exposures; or at
least, they might selectively hedge their
currency exposures. This asserted se-
lective hedging policy should be an
interesting topic for future research.
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